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In 1978 the Somoza family reign came to an end after 42 years of ruling of

the

Nicaraguan society. A short-lived revolution between the Somoza and Sandinista

National Liberation Front, headed by Daniel Ortega brought the Sandinista to power on

July 19, 1979. The change of government power worried the U.S. and that is when they
decided they needed to actively become involved. In their involvement the U.S.
supported the Somoza Govemment, opposed the Sandinistas, and supported the Contras
through military and non militaristic aid.
The US government had supported the Anastasio Somoza Debayle family regime

from the 1930's until Carter cut US military aid in late t979. In support, the people arose
and joined the Sandinista to overthrow the Somoza

Regime. Somoza was removed from

power and the Sandinistas came to rule a poverty-stricken country with high rates of
homelessness and illiteracy as well as insufficient health care was empowered on July 19,

1979.They waged a massive education campaign that reduced illiteracy from 507o to

I37o, andintroduced an immunization program that eliminated polio and reduced infant

mortality to a third of the rate it had been before the revolution.
The Sandinistas authoritarian dictatorship socialized the economy, confiscated
and nationalized Somozapnvate property, along with suppressing the freedom of speech
and religion. The U.S. was not pleased that the Somoza was overthrown with a successful

Sandinista revolution. U.S. and Nicaraguan relations began to deteriorate once the
Sandinistas openly admitted its Soviet and Cuban relations.
Soon after the CIA reported the flow of arms from Nicaragua's arms supply (one

of the largest armies in the world in proportion to its population) to El Salvador guerrillas

in 1980. In response the Carter Administration

suspended $15

million in aid to

2

Nicaragua, aid which was a strategy to win the Sandinistas to Democracy'
Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United Sates in 1981 and was

of Soviet
determined to "do something about what he considered a growing tide
and
expansionism"l He condemned the Marxist Sandinista occupation of Nicaragua
the U.S. just
pledged establish a free and independent government which would submit to
as

Somoza. Somoza was supported by the U.S.

because he assured a cooperative

government in
interest seeking partnership with U.S. An unauthorized socialist
Nicaragua threatened region's stability, ultimately threatening democracy'
push for a
The Reagan administration struggled with the decision of whether to

third world
foreign policy of containment or roll to back the Communist empire from
nations. How to best resolve

a

destabilizing Central America with Soviet arms and

between republicans
humanitarian aid influencing the region was disputed. In the dispute
deeply divided among
and democrats, America's foreign policy towards Nicaragua was
the two.
Three months following Reagan inauguration, aid was suspended to the
antiSandinistas. Early March, Regan approved $19.5 million to support the rising
Costa Rica' The
Sandinistas (Contras) insurgency who had gathered in Honduras and

groups would
actual organization did not take place until November 17, 1981, but the
serve as an indirect way of possibly overthrowing the Sandinistas'

Nicaragua's ambassador opened negotiations in hopes of using foreign aid to
monitor Nicaragua's foreign policy and reduce its Soviet

ties. Prior to the allocation of

assistance to the
economic aid the US also asked that the Sandinistas end the training and

,

the struggle for peace (South
Noam Chomsky. Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America &

End Press, 1986.)
J

reasons: first,
Salvadoran gorillas, and limit its military buildup. The talks failed for two

would end any
the hardJiners "war party" opposed aid as a compromise "because, that
opposed the
hope of getting Nicaragua back from communism."2 Second, Sandinistas

there
proposal because the U.S. was only making "promises," not commitments' Though
was a division among the party members, a general concession was made.

In the second round of policy making in November 1981, the Opinions Paper,
included;
which consisted of possible solutions was created. These possible solutions
aid to
direct military action towards Cuba, overthrowing the Sandinistas, or increased

political opposition groups. Political leaders collectively supported aid to the Contra
because "there was no other way to do

it"3 However, to avoid direct American military

for direct
action, prevent inaction of the situation, Aid to the Contra's was a substitute
Cuban action
Contra rebel attacks rose during the spring of 1982 with the 3000 indigenous
These attacks
troops in Honduras (FDN, Nicaragua Democratic Force, AKA Contra).

in
were directed towards the infrastructure and targets of opportunity. The CIA assisted
declared a
training, by first giving advice indirectly and than directly. The Sandinistas
state of emergency once Contra attacks were

fully mobile against them' At the

verbal abuse
meantime, the U.S. attempted to raise international support, used tactics of
the military
towards Nicaragua, reported Nicaragua's human rights violations, along with

incentives,
build up. With one last effort to use military action as a basis for diplomatic
the

2

,

.,NSC staff argued that negotiations with communists were futile and useful only to

Contra Aid, Congressional digest (March 1998)
r.Interbran"h-Rirairy and the Regan Docffine in Nicaragua" Political Science ouarterly:

irnffis"ott,

summer 97

,Yol.

112 Issue 2.
4

silence critics in congress and the public"a.
and
Once again the opposition passed the Authorization Act in both the senate
house which "prohibiting the use of CIA funds to overthrow the Nicaraguan

did the
government."s This posed as a warning to the administration. Not until late 1982
overthrow of
media report that the Reagan's Nicaragua policy was certainly rollback: the
the Sandinista government

In March of 1983 public opposition rose, criticizingthe overthrow of the

"We do not seek
Sandinistas for a lack of U.S. goals in Nicaragua. Regan than stated,
Our interest is to ensure that it does not
[the government of Nicaragua's] overthrow.
purpose.. . to
infect its neighbor's through the export of subversion and violence. our

from
prevent the flow of arms to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica"6
Nicaragua.

in
The situation continued to escalate as the Contras increased to 7,000 troops

April and the CIA estimated to spend $45 million by the end of the year. The House
assistance
Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Subcommittee voted to end all American

to reshape, re-define the American foreign policy. In the mean time, the administration,
region and
fearing forced extraction, complied to create a comprehensive policy for the
raise support for the Reagan Doctrine. Reagan reiterated its reasoning for continued

by
support to the contras and stated, "Congress or the country is prepared to stand
we
passively while the people of Central America are delivered to totalitarianism, and
ourselves are left vulnerable to new dangers."T

o

Ibid,

5

tbrd,+

6

tbid,
, frAi.t

All of these combined efforts were to

3
5

"a

(Center Magazine 7-8Barnes "Central American Realities: U.S. policy options (a symposium)",
5

continue the current military efforts.

With no U.S. aid to the Contras, they resorted to hit and runs, sabotages, attacks
on isolated military units, and torturing and killing whomever associated themselves with
the Sandinistas. The Contras actions were viewed by the U.S. as a deliberate campaign

of terrorism. Diplomatic negotiations were despised and distrusted by Regan because
socialism could not be trusted and that it may undermine the U.S. primary interests.
George Shultz, Secretary of State quoted, "the hardliners (republicans) wanted no part of
a

diplomatic effort.. .. To them, diplomacy was an avenue to accommodation."s Again

there is evidence of raising contention among the congressional and senate members

about diplomacy.
There was a reverse to reinstated $24 million dollars to the Contras that they may
conduct their own attacks on Nicaragua to stop the flow of arms into Nicaragua. On
January 6,1984, the CIA mined Nicaragua's harbors and instructed the Contras to take
the blame. Congress was outraged for the CIA involvement because of the unauthorized
the mission. The Reagan denied any involvement.

By mid 1984 the Contra was 10,000-15,000 troops strong but funding was
removed. Reagan reiterated the continued support for the Contras in hopes of slowly
making its case for the need of full support through aid. Reagan attempted to build the
Contra credibility by referring to them as "freedom fighters," but avoided his rollback
goal in fear of public opposition.

As a last effort, President Reagan proposed $14 million dollars in non lethal aid

for

a cease-fire

during negotiations between the Sandinistas and Contras. Interpreted as

84)
8

D. Schorr "Undoing the Reagan Doctrine", New leader, 4117ll989,Yol-72Issue 7
6

failed in the House
daily necessities, non-lethal aid won the approval of the Senate, but
on

April 23,1985. Other alternatives were also rejected by the house which brought the

yet and the president
US and its policy back to square one. No progress had been made
promised to return to congress for aid to the Contras'
a draft which
Around the same period the FSLN (Sandinistas) was strengthen by

because of attacks
recruited 40,000 troops. The Contras were driven back into Honduras

(Batallones de Lucha Iregulares)
from the light armored and highly maneuverable BLIs
Sandinistas militarY unit.

At last the president finally committed his administration in a letter to "political,
"we do not seek the military
not military solutions in Central America" and further stated
was in response
overthrow of the Sandinista government."e The president's address

The House passed the
Nicaraguan's President Daniel Ortego publicized trip to Moscow.

bill, which excluded the CIA's

and Department of Defense's involvement, and another

to congress to get
division was created to distribute the aid. President Reagan than went

negotiations. The U'S'
more non-lethal Contra aid that would be used as leverage during
and would
Allies in Central America were informed of the U.S.'s goal to seek victory
.,not

leading Central
be forced to seek a political accommodation with the Sandinistas,"lo

of 1986, the NSC
America to believe that it had no intentions of negotiating. In January
believed
(National Security Council) asked for additional Contra military aid which they
also giving the
would give the u.S. an advantage to winning diplomatic negotiations,
a problem,
Sandinistas an incentive to seriously negotiate. "while Nicaragua was

e

Congressional Record, 11 June 1985, (H40934094)

,, gf;-oiK"rworthy. "US policy in cenffal America:

a

choice denied", (Current History 84)
7

policy
Military support for the contras would solve it."11 This shows the U.S. foreign
the strong
focus on its military strength. U.S. funding went to the contras to counteract
Sandinista opposition with weapons and ammo'

In 1986 president

Reagan declared, "America

will support with moral

and

fight and win
material assistance your right not to just fight and die for freedom, but to
after the House
freedom. ..,,r2 ]Itis not known whether this statement was made before or

of encouraging
reversed its decision on Contra Aid on March 22,1986 due for blame
approach'
invasion and attacks on Honduras camps, and to pursue a more diplomatic

25ft. Also, in
Again the House passed $100 million in military and non lethal aid on June
alnmo,
August the Reagan Doctrine Aid was passed which added to the aid in weapons,
The United States
training and guidance provided by the CIA and department of defense.

inability to uphold a stable and decisive role in foreign policy is the more evident

as

possible solutions are toiled with.

Early 1987 congress attempted to end U.S. support for the contras by cutting off
Central America,
the funds remaining from the 1986 authoization. To promote peace in

five Central America presidents agreed to meet on August 6,1987

'

Costa Rica'

El

Peace Accord
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed the Guatemala

fight for
which was presented by Costa Rica's Government that agreed to commit to
to years
peace and eliminate war as well as bring peace, social justice and resolution

of

is
frustration. The ten parts to this agreement asks for governments to do whatever
necessary for an effective cease of fire, a democratrzation process with

civil rights,

justice, and a strong non-colrupt central government. This also includes free elections, a

rrtbid,

12

Record,2
'2 Ibid Congress
8

groups refrain
stop to the dispersal of aid of any type to gorilla militants, and that these

from using these five nations territory for aggression. It involves the peaceful
the
negotiations of disarmament and removal of the forces along with the assisting

to cooperate
regions displaced persons. And as a final note, it encourages each nation
and comply within 90 days of signing the document. A

follow up would than be

that are
conducted to strengthen any loop holes within the document or those nations

complying.
March
Nicaragua announced that talks with the rebels would begin no later than
in February
1, 1988. This decision came from a two month long dialogue, during January
congress passed
brought the Yatama/ Nicaragua Accord. During the two month dialogue,

g.1 million dollars in humanitarian and demobilization aid for the Contras through
February of 1988. January 19, 1988 president Reagan informed the five Central

in fact
American nations that the efforts of reaching a ceasefire consensus failed, but
The first
negotiations of a cease of fire were not expected to take place until March.
negotiate with
evidence of progress was in mid January when the Sandinistas agreed to
the Contras and

lift restriction

on its

civil liberties. The U.S. had attempted to bargain

with the Nicaraguan government to fix its human rights violations. On April 1, 1990,
homes after
Contra forces demobilized and ex-Contra fighters returned to their former
fears of the Sandinista had settled.

I believe that the U.S. public did not extensively comprehend the truth of the
policy focus and
matter; that Central America was misinformed by the US on its foreign
goals in Nicaragua, and the Regan administration refused to undertake a diplomatic
approach to the regional Soviet threat. The Soviets spent 1.086

billion dollars in various

9

in direct and
forms of aid to the Sandinistas the U.S. must have spent billions worth
indirect aid to assist the contras or Nicaragua'
was
America's foreign policy towards Latin America, in particular Nicaragua,

which have been
centered on U.S. self centered shot term interest and endeavors
relations' The U'S'
spotlighted through out the history of U.S. and Nicaraguan foreign

from a diplomatic
would have benefited politically and spend less of its tax payer dollars
but the Reagan
approach in Central American. The U.S. may have looked at the option
the
administration was set in removing any source of communism which included
Reagan
Sandinistas. Reagan's failure to achieve its goal is reflected back a weak

regime it
Doctrine when it was applied to Nicaragua. Unable to overthrow the Sandinista
Nicaragua's
is a standing monument of failure. These events have negatively shaped
perception of the u.S. imperialism including Latin America.

It was Costa Rican's President, Arias who was most influential in bringing

an end

nations reto the regional conflict. He kept his nation neutral and restrained from its

His ambition
armament. His belief and ambition to peruse diplomacy proved successful'
of the 1987
towards achieving peace through no engaging means, and was a candidate
Peace Pnze.

In conclusion, the U.s. supported the Somoza Govemment, opposed the
aid to
Sandinistas, and supported the Contras through military and non militaristic
on both
overthrow the Sandinistas. Although there is much criticism of the loss of lives

justified by
fronts, president Reagan stated that the means (although controversial) are
the means
the end result. president Reagan backed its hard-lined rhetoric with whatever
necessary to

win. Force

was used in attempt to contain communism, protect U'S'

10

economic and political interests with little room for unthreatening diplomatic
negotiations.
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